A city encircled, civilians under bombardment, and warnings of genocide going largely unanswered — El Fasher, Sudan's last major urban holdout in North Darfur, has become the starkest test yet of whether international institutions can act when it matters most.

El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, endures relentless bombardment by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — a paramilitary group that emerged from the notorious Janjaweed militias of the early 2000s. The RSF is pressing its campaign against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and civilian populations across the region. The broader civil war between the two factions, which erupted in April 2023, has produced what many observers describe as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises in recent years.

Numerous human rights organizations, along with some governments and parliamentary bodies, have warned that conditions in Darfur meet the threshold for genocide — or risk escalating to it. The United Nations has stopped short of a formal genocide designation, with UN officials and agencies instead warning of genocidal violence and a serious risk of further atrocity crimes. The U.S. government's formal genocide designation for Darfur dates to 2004 and refers to earlier atrocities in the same region. Under international law, genocide refers to acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The RSF's campaign has reportedly targeted non-Arab communities with particular intensity, according to human rights monitors.

Despite the gravity of these warnings, meaningful international intervention has not materialized. The UN Security Council — the body most empowered to authorize military or punitive action — remains effectively paralyzed. Russia and China, both permanent members with veto power, have historically resisted resolutions that could authorize intervention in Sudan, citing principles of national sovereignty. The geopolitical calculations of major powers appear, according to analysts, to outweigh the humanitarian calculus on the ground.

Regional diplomatic efforts have similarly struggled. The African Union (AU) and regional bloc IGAD have led parallel peace initiatives, while a separate round of negotiations — held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United States — collapsed without producing a lasting ceasefire. Neither the AU nor the Arab League, which has also engaged diplomatically, possesses the military capacity or political consensus to enforce compliance from either warring party.

The visibility gap surrounding this conflict is, according to media analysts, striking. Coverage of Sudan has reportedly remained thin relative to the scale of the crisis, particularly when compared to other active conflicts receiving sustained international attention. Advocacy groups argue this lack of coverage directly suppresses the political pressure needed to prompt governmental action in Western capitals.

Complicating the response further is Sudan's complex web of external entanglements. The RSF has reportedly received support from the United Arab Emirates, a significant diplomatic and economic partner for both Western nations and regional powers — though the UAE has disputed characterizations of its role. The SAF, meanwhile, maintains ties with Egypt and has sought backing from other actors. These relationships make a unified international front politically costly for the parties best positioned to act.

Humanitarian access to El Fasher and the surrounding Darfur region has been severely restricted. Aid organizations report that relief convoys face obstruction and that aid workers operate under extreme risk. The UN World Food Programme and other agencies have repeatedly warned of famine conditions spreading through the region, with millions of people reportedly displaced from their homes.

Critics of the international community point to a familiar and painful pattern: solemn declarations of "never again" following historical atrocities, followed by institutional inertia when the next crisis arrives. Defenders of the current approach argue that external military intervention in Sudan's complex, multi-faction conflict could deepen instability rather than resolve it.

The question confronting international institutions is not whether El Fasher constitutes a crisis — that much is, according to analysts across the political spectrum, beyond serious dispute. The question is whether the architecture of international law and collective security, constructed largely in response to 20th-century atrocities, retains any meaningful capacity to act when political and economic interests counsel inaction. So far, the answer emerging from El Fasher appears to be: not yet.